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Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury,

1900-1949
JENNIFER

B.

WRIGGINS©*

"[T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line. "1
Tort law [is] public law in disguise. 2

INTRODUCTION3
Tort law is one of the central, and most familiar, aspects of U.S.
law. Every law student, by the end of his or her first year, has a basic
picture of the subject of torts. In addition to being a significant mech
anism for compensating and deterring injury,4 it has significant norma
tive and narrative dimensions.5 Tort law values and recognizes injury
in ways that create deterrence incentives for potential defendants and
send broad messages about what society deems important. However,
© Jennifer B. Wriggins 2005
• Professor, University of Maine School of Law.
1. W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SouLS OF BLACK FOLK 5 (Everyman's Library 1993) (1903).
2. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1959).
3. Acknowledgments: I am grateful to David Goldman, Zachary Brandmeir, and Joshua
Scott for outstanding research assistance. Thanks to David Achtenberg, Martha Chamallas,
George Chauncey, William Corbett, Zanita Fenton, Rachel D. Godsil, James Hackney, Duncan
Kenneay, Lois Lupica, and Deborah Tuerkheimer for reviewing drafts. Thanks to Dean Colleen
Khoury, Dean Peter Pitegoff, and the University of Maine School of Law for funding this
project, and to the University of Maine School of Law Faculty for allowing me to present an
early draft at a faculty workshop. The Boston University School of Law Faculty and the
Northeastern University School of Law Faculty provided very useful comments at faculty
workshop presentations. I also have benefited from discussions with Mary L. Bonauto, Keith N.
Hylton, Randall Kennedy, Katharine Silbaugh, Barbara Welke, and John Fabian Witt. Many
thanks to the librarians at the Donald Garbrecht Law Library at the University of Maine School
of Law, particularly Christine Hepler, Sherry McCall, and Greg Stowe. Thanks to the editors of
the HowARD LAw JouRNAL, particularly Brandi Johnson and Autumn Montague.
4. DAN T. DoBBS, THE LAw oF ToRTS 12 (2000) (noting that "[t)he most commonly men
tioned aims of tort law are (1) compensation of injured persons and (2) deterrence of undesir
able behavior").
5. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance
Funding, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1721, 1748 (1997).
2005 Vol. 49 No . 1

99

Howard Law Journal

we have an incomplete and impoverished understanding of the torts
system because we have ignored the ways that it has been structured
by systems of racial inequality and has reinforced those systems. This
Article begins to broaden our understanding of the torts system by
focusing on ways in which it measured harm to plaintiffs depending on
their race during the first half of the twentieth century.
Readers often approach the topic of race6 and torts in the first
half of the twentieth century with one of two unexamined assump
tions. The first is an ahistorical assumption that the torts system has
treated everyone equally, and therefore race has been irrelevant in the
torts system in the United States. The second assumption is that the
United States' legal system, given the virulent racism of the era, must
have denied to all black people all tort compensation for their injuries.
This Article demonstrates how both assumptions are incorrect. De
spite the barriers imposed by racist exclusionary structures and vio
lence during this period, many black people sued for and received
compensation for tort injuries, winning verdicts and appellate deci
sions in all regions.7 However, the fact that black plaintiffs partici
pated in the torts system as plaintiffs does not mean that they were
6. This Article considers cases involving those perceived to be African American and Cau
casian. Case s involving other racial or ethnic groups have not been researched for this Article.
The term "black" refers to African American people and others identified in cases as "Negro" or
"colored." Occasionally the term " African American" is used in such contexts. The term
"white" refers to Caucasian people and those perceived or identified as white. This Article's
focus on issues involving blacks and whites is not to suggest that such issues comprise the entire
subject of race and torts. See generally. Leslie Espinoza, Angela P. Harris, Afterward: Embrac
ing the Tar-Baby: LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess ofRace, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1585 (1997) . This
Article does not discuss the interesting and important issues of racial identification, social con
struction, and performance that scholarship has begun to address. See, e.g., Ariela J. Gross,
Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth -Century South, 108 YALE
L. J. 109 (1998); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
lllusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994); Cheryl J. Harris, White
ness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709 (1993); Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History ofRace
in the United States , 112 YALE L. J. 1473 (2003).
7. See infra Parts I-III; BARBARA YoUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GEN·
DER, RAcE, LAw, & TIJE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 (2001). Indeed, favorable jury
verdicts, trial decisions, and appellate tort rulings for black plaintiffs were obtained even during
the late nine teenth century. See, e.g., The General Rucker, 35 F. 152 (W.D. Tenn. 1888). The
court referred to "simple-minded Negroes," and described the plaintiff as a "negro man of infer
ior intelligence," where the black plaintiff was awarded $100 in an admiralty case for battery by
first mate. /d. at 154, 159; Gasway v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. , 1877 WL 2979 (Ga. Jan. Term
1877) (reversing award of $10 for a black man's tort suit against railway for conductor and claims
agent's threatening and insulting conduct towards him and ordering remand for new trial be
cause jury instructions were improperly favorable to the defendant); Louisville, Nashville &
GreatS. R.R. v. Fleming, 1884 WL 3325 (Tenn. Dec. Term 1884) (ordering new trial because jury
instructions were too unfavorable to the railroad against eighty-three year old black man ejected
from a train for allegedly not having a ticket readily available).
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treated equally with whites. Examining inequality in the law, both
then and now, requires more than knowing whether clear exclusions
operated to blatantly fence out groups of people. 8 As scholars have
shown more recently in other contexts, decentralized, informal prac
tices engaged in by individual actors within the legal system, for exam
ple, have resulted in a discriminatory structure and discriminatory
outcomes when aggregated.9 Indeed, race has mattered in torts in
ways that have resulted in categorization of harm to black plaintiffs as
in some instances necessarily less than to whites. Moreover, individu
alized, decentralized practices have resulted in lower aggregate com
pensation to blacks than to whites. This Article claims that a range of
evidence compels the conclusion that African Americans' tort claims
generally were devalued relative to whites' tort claims during the first
half of the twentieth century.
The intersections of race and tort law are particularly provocative
because they reflect an ongoing tension in tort law, and they implicate
broad questions of equal treatment. This tension is between the no
tion that liability and damages should be determined on an individual
basis, and the notion that similar injuries should be treated similarly.
On the one hand, a broad basic principle of the rule of law for hun
dreds of years has been that everyone in the same situation should be
treated the same way.10 According to basic ideas of formal equality,
8. See JoDY DAVID ARMOUR, NeoROPHOBtA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
CosTS oF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNcONVE.N·
TIONAL EviDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); Martha Chamallas, The Ar
chitecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 463 (1998); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimina
tion Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression , 98 YALE
L.J. 1559 (1 989).
9. See AYRES, supra note 8, at 20-25. Subtle but powerful cognitive patterns may result in
unequal treatment. See Chamallas, supra note 8.
10. The idea that " like cases should be treated alike" dates back to Aristotle. ARISTOTLE,
THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 112-116 (J. L. Ackrill & J . 0. Urmson eds., David Ross trans., rev.
ed. 1980). This idea is often seen as a foundational principle of the U.S. legaJ system. See, e.g.,
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 147 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(describing the idea that " like cases should be treated alike" as an "underlying and pervasive
principle of la w"). Articulating the broad principle only begins the analysis of determining what
are the releva nt similarities and differences between cases and situations, because as Peter Wes
ten explains in The Empty Idea of Equality , 95 HARv. L. REv. 537,596 n.72 (1982), the idea does
not provide guidance about what factors are relevant and what are not; see also Kenneth I.
Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1974) (noting that the idea is
incomplete without criteria of likeness and difference). The determinations by courts and legis
latures of what constitute relevant similarities and differences often are what is most contested.
Some theorists have argued that the principle of treating like cases alike, also referred to as
formal equality, is inadequate, arguing, for example, that sameness should not be a prerequisite
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similar injuries should produce similar compensation.11 A similar in
jury to a black person and a white person should result in similar lia
bility determinations and similar damages. Also, in theory, to
determine whether a particular result in a particular situation was eq
uitable, one would look at similar situations and see if the result was
the same. If the result was not the same, it was in some way unfair. 12
On the other hand, the individualized assessment of liability and
damages has been and continues to be an important value in the torts
system. 13 The decision-makers often are juries, who have tremendous
discretion in deciding liability and assessing damages. Different juries
and judges can make conflicting determinations of liability and dam
ages on virtually identical facts. As a result, the notion of rigorously
comparing litigation outcomes to determine if parties have ·been
for fair and equal treatment, see, e.g. , CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WoMEN 's LivEs, MEN'S
LAws 45-54 (2005); MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExcLUSION ,
AND AMERICAN LAw 51-78 (1990), and that formal equality masks structures that perpetuate
inequality, see, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 8. Some have attacked the idea as incoherent and
tautological, see, e.g., Westen, supra, while others have argued that the idea has useful aspects,
see e.g., Kent Greenwalt, How Empey is che Idea of Equalicy, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1983).
This Article takes the position that the principle of treating like cases alike is one tool that can
be used to an alyze race and valuation of U .S. tort cases in the first half of the twentieth century.
This tool can be used for this purpose, without accepting the notion that determining what cases
are "like" others is simple or unproblematic. A s will be seen, courts' decisions during this period
about what cases are "like" others provide great insight into the workings of race, racism, and
the civil justice system. See infra Part II. For example, the most glaring violation of this idea is
the law of slavery, according to which some human beings were treated as less than human. See
e.g., THOMAS D . MoRRIS, SoUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAw 1616 - 1860 (1996); JENNY
BouRNE W AHL, THE BoNDSMAN's BuRDEN: AN EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CoMMON LAw
OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY (1998).
11. See supra note 10.
12. This methodology is limited because it does not reveal how "similar" different situations
must be in order to be comparable. It presumes clarity and consensus about what is to be com
pared, when in fact that is often what is most contested. /d.
13. See, e.g. , Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Viclims ofSeptember
11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 573, 578 (2001). Examples of the primacy of individual assessment of
liability and damages are many. For example, the thin skull rule allows decision-makers broad
discretion in determining liability. DoBBS, supra note 4 at 464-465 (describing the "thin skull"
rule that a negligent defendant is liable for all personal injuries the defendant causes the plaintiff
to suffer, even if those injuries are greater than a normal or average person would suffer.).
Juries have tremendous, although not unlimited discretion, in determining damages. See VJN·
CENT R. JoHNsoN & ALLAN GuNN, SruDrEs IN AMERICAN ToRT LAw 176-177 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing additur & remittitur). Tort law, with its individualized assessment of liability and
damages, provides a striking contrast with certain aspects of workers' compensation systems,
Dosss, supra note 4, at 1099-1100 (stating that under workers' compensation systems, whether a
person is inju red is determined on an individual basis but the compensation amount is standard
ized), and with the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund, see, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The
Sepcember 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law , 71
TENN. L. R Ev. 51, 75-79 (2003) (discussing the standardized presumed award of $250,000 for
non-economic damages for family members of September 11 victims).
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treated fairly is foreign to torts, since each injury is conceptualized as
different and each person is different.
Individualized assessment of damages in torts, however, has been
and is a double-edged sword for African American plaintiffs in tort
litigation. On the one hand, the individualized focus has forced courts
and juries to look closely at the facts of each individual plaintiff's in
jury and reach verdicts with reference to that injury. Tort juries and
judges have quantified the unquantifiable, assigning damage amounts
to such concepts as pain and suffering and loss of life through consid
eration of cases one by one. The individualized focus is probably one
reason African American plaintiffs attained as much success as they
did as torts litigants. 14 On the other hand, the individualized focus
allows tremendous inconsistency and makes unequal treatment hard
to detect. 15 Rarely do courts systematically compare results in past
cases. 16 Torts judges and juries prefer instead to treat each case as
unique, using past cases only for very general guidance. Moreover, in
a society divided by racial caste, questions arise about what constitutes
a "similar" injury to a black or white person. 17 Patterns are and have
always been difficult to discern in the multi-tiered and decentralized
system of tort litigation. 18 This Article uses a combination of methods
to consider ways in which the awards in torts cases were influenced by
race: reviewing materials on race and settlement; focusing on one
high-profile New York case; and analyzing all wrongful death appel
late cases from one jurisdiction, Louisiana, from 1900 to 1949. Com
pelling and complex patterns have emerged from this exploration.
The discussion of these patterns begins in the early twentieth cen
tury because that time period marked a confluence of two striking
trends. First, the number of tort cases increased dramatically in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in part because of the
14. See infra Part II.
15. /d.
16. /d.; Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Recognition of Injury: Race, Gender, and Torts, 1900
1950 (June 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Howard Law Journal).
17. See infra Part II; Wriggins, supra note 16.
18. See, e.g., Michael J . Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U . PA. L. REv. 1147, 1154-55, 1190 (1992) (explaining
how aspects of the tort system, such as a decentralized adjudication system and decentralized
recordkeeping, make it hard to study). It is impossible to keep track of cases that are settled
before litigation is even filed. It is also hard to keep track of cases that settle, see Marc Galanter,
Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Mo. L. REv. 1093, 1099-1105 (1996), and to study
the deterrence impact of litigation, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of
Tort Law: Does the Tort System Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994).
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many injuries and deaths connected with industrialization.19 Torts had
only began to be conceptualized as a distinct branch of the law late in
the nineteenth century, and theorists were engaged in analyzing it.20
Second, a burgeoning growth of segregation, violence, discrimina
tory laws, and racism also marked that time period.21 A racial caste
system excluded blacks from equal participation in the legal system,
and its underlying assumptions required social segregation of blacks
and whites, at times in combination with gender .22
The simultaneous resurgence of racism with the growth of tort
law leads to questions about the relationship between tort law, race,
19. JOHN FABIAN Wrrr, THE A ccJOENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED W ORKINOMEN, DESTI·
TUTE Wtoows, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAw 1-15, 25-26, 59 (2004) [hereinafter
W rrr, AccJOENrAL REPUBuc]; Lawrence M. Friedman & Thomas D . Russell, More Civil
Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation, 1901-1910, 34 AM. J . LEGAL HlsT. 295 (1990); see also Law
rence M . Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 AM. B .
FouND. Res. J. 351 (1987). Personal injury litigation did not become a major field of law, nor
were there many tort cases, until the nineteenth century in the United States. LAWRENCE M .
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 300 (2d. ed. 1985) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, His
TORY]; John Fabian Witt, From Loss ofServices to Loss ofSuppon: The Wrongful Death Statutes,
the Origins of Modern Ton Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAw &
Soc. INQUIRY 717, 722 (2002) [hereinafter Witt, Origins of Modem Ton].
20. G. EDWARD WHITE, ToRT LAw tN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (expanded
ed. 2003); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes' influential article, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
Rev. 457 (1897).
21. See, e.g., C . VANN WoODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 98 (1966) (noting
growth of discriminatory and segregation laws during the first two decades of the twentieth cen
tury). More broadly, violence against blacks by whites in the South was pervasive during the Jim
Crow period. WELKE, SUPRA note 7, at 364. Lynching was at its height between 1900 and the
New Deal, and blacks had no political power. LAWRENCE M. fRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAw IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 117 (2002).
22. fRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 111-147, 280-348, 280 (describing the racial caste system
and asserting that the "American system of apartheid was fmnly in place in the first half of the
century''); see generally, JoHN DoLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SotiTHERN ToWN (1957)
(describing social caste system requiring separation of white women from black men while al
lowing white men's access to black women as well as white women). Juries were likely to have
been all white and all male from at least 1900 to at least the 1950s. See Douglas L. Colbert,

Challenging the Challenge: Thineenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 76 CoRNELL L. REv. I, 75-93 (1990) (describing exclusion of blacks from
juries in south and north by exclusionary practices that continued at least until the mid 1960s).
Although the Supreme Court in 1879 held that a statute which on its face barred everyone but
white males from serving on juries was unconstitutional in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879), exclusion of blacks from juries continued, see Gilbert Thomas Stevenson, Race Dis·
tinctions in American Law, 43 AMER. L. REv. 869, 884, 888-900 (1909) (describing results of
survey sent to Southern county clerks that reveal very few blacks served on juries).
Similarly, the vast majority of attorneys were white and male in the South during the flrst
half of the twentieth century: "It is generally known that the Negro lawyers in the Southern
States are few, and it is considered that the field there for the Negro lawyer is not promising."
Id. at 872. By 1940, there were 1,052 black lawyers and judges in the United States, and of these
thirty-nine were women. J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANOPATION: THE MAKING or- THE BLACK
LAwYER, 1844-1944, app. 2, tbl. 13 (1993).
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racism, and equality that have not been considered before.23 What
kinds of cases did black tort plaintiffs win, if any, in the first half of the
twentieth century? When blacks and whites prevailed in tort cases,
were the awards similar for similar injuries, or were awards to blacks
less? Did the torts system recognize different kinds of harm to black
and to white plaintiffs? How was the intersection of race and torts
affected by gender?24 Because appellate courts in the first half of the
twentieth century often identified the race of the plaintiff as "negro"
or "colored," we can begin to formulate answers to these questions.25
This Article primarily focuses on situations where harm to both
blacks and whites was recognized as tortious, such as physical injuries
caused by a railroad company's negligence; and also focuses on how
the torts system measured harm to blacks and whites.Z6 Underlying
23. Previous discussions of tort law and history generally have not discussed the racial
dimensions of tort law. See, e.g., ToRT LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTER
PRETATIONS (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS oF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); WHITE, supra note 20;
WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 19. A notable exception is WELKE, supra note 7.
Previous publications about race and law generally have not focused on tort law, however, work
that has focused on race and torts includes: ChamaUas, Architecture, supra note 8; Martha
Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic
Loss, 38 LoY L.A. L. REv. 1435 (2005); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific
and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FoRDHAM
L. Rev. 73, 75 (1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, Questioning]; Okianer Christian Dark, Racial In
sults: " Keep Thy Tongue From Evil," 24 SuFFOLK L. Rev. 559 (1990); Richard Delgado, Words
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 133, 150 (1982); Rachel D . Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Rule of Law in the Jim Crow Era
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Howard Law Journal); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the
Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract
Law, 63 U. CJN. L. REv. 269 (1994); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Search
ing for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 761, 780 (1996); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a
Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. OF GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 139 (2005) [hereinafter
Wriggins, Toward]; Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of
Discovery.in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REv. 1025 (1997).
24. Complete consideration of issues involving race and gender is beyond the scope of this
Article. See infra Part II. See WELKE, supra note 7, and Wriggins, Toward, supra note 23, for
related discussion.
25. WELKE, supra note 7 {discussing hundreds of cases from the early twentieth century
which identify the race of black plaintiffs).
26. Related questions involve whether the tort system imposed different standards of liabil
ity according to race. For example, did the courts through explicit doctrinal rules make it harder
for blacks or whites to win tort cases? The preliminary answer is largely no; I believe many
structural factors, such as the all-white legal system, probably made it more difficult for black
plaintiffs to win on liability, but clear doctrinal rules were not discemable.
Courts sometimes rejected race-based generalizations that white litigants argued should ap
ply to help them win their cases. For example, in Patterson v. Risher, 221 S.W. 468 (Ark. 1920), a
young white man was killed in a mine when a mule that was pulling the cart he was riding in got
free and the cart smashed into a door. The deceased man's father argued that the mine superin
tendent had created an unsafe workplace and that the mule driver, a black co-defendant, was
"ignorant and reckless." /d. at. 469. Rejecting the claim, the court wrote that " in the absence of
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this inquiry is a broad focus on the relationship between torts, includ
ing tort compensation, and racial equality.27
A threshold question at the intersection of race and torts is why
and how black tort plaintiffs were able to achieve any access and suc
cess in the civil justice arena, given the racism of the society and the
legal system.28 One part of the answer must lie in the private enforce
ment mechanism of torts, namely, contingency fee agreements. These
agreements, which came into widespread usage in the late nineteenth
century,29 are a widely used method of financing litigation in which
the attorney advances the costs of the litigation and takes her fee and

proof tending to show that it was negligence per sc to employ a negro driver ... it cannot be said
that there was any testimony in the record to warrant a fmding that the appellee company was
negligent in employing the negro, Hubbard , as driver." /d. at 471. In Taylor v. Atlantic Coast
Line Rail Co., 59 S.E. 641 (S.C. 1907), the plaintiff, a white woman, argued that the railroad had
a duty to escort her from the train station to a nearby boarding house through a crowd of unruly
black men who were on the platform when she got off the train in the middle of the night,
because the railroad should have reasonably anticipated danger to her by the mere presence of
the crowd of black men. /d. at 642. The procedural status makes it hard to glean the exact scope
of the duty ruling, but the court seemed to reject such a rule. /d. at 643-44. See also infra note 53
(discussing whether courts imposed different standards of liability in Louisiana based on race of
the plaintiff a nd reaching a largely negative conclusion). Further research may prompt revisions
to this conclusion.
27. There are several reasons for the primary focus ending at mid-century. Not only do
published judicial opinions after 1950 generally lack the derogatory racial generalizations that
appear in some earlier opinions, but after 1950, courts identify the race of the plaintiff less fre
quently than earlier. See infra Part 11.
28. The fact that some cases were brought and won by African American plaintiffs should
not lead one to forget the equally, and possibly more, significant cases that probably were not
brought. Part of the story about race and torts in the twentieth century is how the torts system
has not provided remedies for much racially-influenced or motivated tortious (and criminal)
harm such as lynching, an act very rarely prosecuted criminally. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAw 47-49 (1997). Kennedy defines lynching as "a killing done by several
people acting in concert outside the legal process to punish a person perceived to have violated a
law or custom." /d. at 42. Civil lawsuits seeking compensation for lynching also seem to have
been very rare. JAMES HARMON CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAw 78-80, 119 (1933) (dis
cussing the indictment system and citing newspaper articles that discussed a total of eight civil
cases, including one against a railroad for furnishing a special train to a lynch mob, for which the
deceased 's widow received $7,000). Although 72.7% of reported lynchings in the United States
between 1882 and 1968 were of black victims, the remaining lynching victims were white. KEN.
NEDY, supra at 42. Other than Williams v. Great Southern Lumber, 277 U.S. 19 (1928), which
involved a lynching of a white man, there did not seem to be reported appellate cases seeking
compensation for lynching of black people. Doubtless, countless acts by whites towards African
Americans, such as assaults and batteries that would otherwise be tortious, were not prosecuted,
for a variety of reasons. The under-enforcement in this context must have been particularly
extreme for many reasons linked to the racist caste system in which potential black plaintiffs
lived.
29. fRI EDMAN, HisTORY, supra note 19,. at 482; see also Wrrr, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC,
supra note 19, at 59-63 (noting that in urban areas after 1860 there were many lawyers, and the
use of contingent fee agreements in personal injury cases was widespread).
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expenses out of the proceeds.3° For the tort system to work as an
effective deterrent, of course, it is essential that lawsuits are brought.31
Lawyers who work on a contingency basis have incentives to select
and aggressively pursue cases for which their clients are likely to win
on liability and recover significant damages, whatever the race of the
injured person. Many black clients, such as in the cases discussed in
this Article, could not have paid a lawyers' hourly fee or advanced
litigation expenses, but were able to bring tort suits. The fact that
these suits were brought at all is in part a story of the success of con
tingency fee agreements.
African Americans may have been successful torts litigants be
cause lawyers selected only the strongest cases to bring, taking into
account factors such as liability, the nature of the defendant, and dam
ages. Many of the defendants were railroad companies, which may
have enabled lawyers to tap into widespread local anger at railroads
for their unchecked power and the number of injuries they inflicted. 32
Individual claims brought by injured black people against large de
fendants may not have fundamentally challenged the racial caste sys
tem. However, some personal injury cases won by black plaintiffs
were summarized by the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People in its magazine, The Crisis, suggesting that they
were important statements of self-determination to many blacks at the
time.33
This discussion has laid the groundwork for further exploration of
how the tort system valued harm to whites and blacks differently in
30. For more recent discussion of contingency fee agreements, see Symposium, Contingency
Fee Financing of Litigation in America, 47 DEPAUL L. R£v. 227 (1998).
31. RicHARD A. PoSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 191 (4th ed. 1992).
32. See WELKE, supra note 7, at 99-100 (describing widespread anger at railroads in the
early twentieth century and at the height of Jim Crow).
33. See, e.g., NAACP, THE CRISIS, Courts, May 1914, at 11 (reporting on five personal in
jury awards won by black plaintiffs); /d., Courts, Aug. 1913, at 168 (reporting on $5,000 New
York jury verdict for widow of black man against a man for causing the murder of her husband);
ld., Courts, June 1913, at 68-69 (reporting on $300 award in a Mississippi court to "Pope Swint, a
Negro, for discomfort on an excursion train," and a $20,000 jury verdict in Oregon to "John
Mathews, a Negro, for personal injuries caused by the Oregon Independent Paving Company" );
ld., Courts, Feb. 1912, at 145 (reporting on New York court award of $10,000 to William Chinn
against Ferro Construction Company for workplace injuries); /d., Courts, Jan. 1912, at 100 (re
porting on $5,000 award to a "colored man" for injury to eyesight in North Carolina); I d., Courts,
Jan. 1914, at 116 (reporting on a verdict of a former Pullman porter who received a verdict of
$1,250 for personal injuries, and contrasting it with a large damage award affrrmed by the Su
preme Court of Mississippi to a white woman for having been "compelled to remain in a coach
in which there were three colored bishops"); /d., Courts, Jan. 1911 (reporting on verdict in false
imprisonmen t case by black Pullman Porter George Griffin against Jim Brady) (discussed infra
Part III).
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the first half of the twentieth century. Since most cases settle before
trial, which has been true at least since the early twentieth century,
information about how claims were valued in pretrial settlement is
irnportant. 34 Part I reviews evidence that claims adjusters, for claims
against railroad companies, considered injuries suffered by black
plaintiffs to be worth less than injuries suffered by white plaintiffs, and
thus paid less to settle black plaintiffs' claims. Part II analyzes dam
ages in wrongful death and survival cases decided by appellate courts
in Louisiana from 1900 to 1949> by comparing cases brought by fami
lies of blacks who were tortiously killed, to cases brought by families
of whites tortiously killed. This section also discusses family and gen
der issues arising from the structure and application of the relevant
laws. Part III discusses a 1909 New York tort case, controversial at
the time, where the trial judge explicitly endorsed devaluation of
blacks' tort claims. 35 Part IV suggests that past patterns have not dis
appeared by briefly reviewing more recent contemporary evidence of
devaluation linked with race in torts.
PART I.

RACE AND SETILEMENT OF RAILWAY
INJURY CLAIMS

Railroad injuries in the mid and late nineteenth century spurred
the development of tort doctrine and tort practice.36 Thousands of
lawsuits were brought against railroad companies in the late nine
teenth and early twentieth century for a wide range of injuries, both
mental and physical.37 In response, railroad companies organized de
partments of "claims agents" to attempt to settle claims before trial.38
Most claims never made it to trial or resulted in appellate opinions,
but we~e often settled through claims agents. 39
34. WEL KE, supra note 7, at 112 (noting that by the beginning of the twentieth century,
streetcar and railroad companies settled the large majority of claims against them before suit was
even filed) . For anecdotal discussion of recent race and settlement behavior see McClellan,
supra note 23.
35. On the importance of trials in understanding law and culture, see Ariela J. Gross, Essay,
Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery , 101 CoLU M . L. REv. 640,
650-661 (2001) . On the importance of trials in establishing settlement benchmarks, see Samuel
R. Gross & Kent D . Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44
U .C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 5 (1996). See generally, WELKE, supra note 7 at 379·389 (listing trial tran
scripts of cases brought against railroads by black plaintiffs).
36. See supra nn. 19 & 20.
37. See supra note 19; WELKE, supra note 7, at 82.
38. W ELKE, supra note 7, at 106.
39. l d . at 112.
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Racial disparities surfaced through the payment of claims. Ac
cording to historian Barbara Welke, a 1905 article in the Street Rail
way Journal noted that the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company kept
elaborate files recording settlements by "nationality" and gender for
use in valuing and settling future claims.40 The nationalities were
"American," "Hebrew," "Irish," "Italian," "Negro," and "Other For
eigners."41 In 1904,4.7% of the cases settled by the company involved
black claimants, but only 2.3% of the damages paid went to these
claimants.42 This disparity is pronounced, although more research
about race and claims paying practices would be necessary before de
finitive conclusions could be drawn.
An influential text for railroad claims agents published in 1927
endorsed r acial inequality in claims practices. It noted:
The Constitution of the United States guarantees its citizens the
equal protection of the law and provides that legally no difference
shall be made between citizens on account of a difference in race or
color . .. . But ... some of these guarantees have come to be greatly
modified in the actual life of the nation. 43

The manual went on to explain that juries did not value the life of
a black man equally with that of a white man, and to state "'[c]ertainly
that is true in the South, where it is claimed that the true values in
such matters are better understood than elsewhere.' " 44 The manual
discussed t he importance of keeping precise statistical records, by race
as well as occupation, in determining the values for which later cases
should be settled, noting that "'[a] brakeman is not always a brake
man. A white brakeman is a brakeman; but a negro brakeman is most
likely only a negro."' 45 For whites, occupation was the dominant fac
tor, while for blacks, race was the dominant factor, according to the
manual.
For blacks' claims to be devalued in the process of settlement, it
did not even need to be true that juries valued black lives less than
40. /d. a t 111.
41. Id.
42. ld.
43. WELKE, supra note 7, at 111 (citing SMITH R. BRITIINGHAM, THE CLAIM AGENT AND
His WoRK: INVESTIGATJON AND SETTLEMENT oF CLAIMs FOR PERSONAL INJURJES 270-271
(New York 1927)).
44. /d.
45. /d. The manual went on to state, "the rude emigrant trackman is often viewed as sub
human. ... Therefore, for statistical purposes these similar types should perhaps be kept in
classes by themselves, although . .. to do so involves palpable and extremely serious difficulties."

Id.
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white lives, as the manual stated they did. Rather, if claims agents,
black plaintiffs, and their lawyers all believed this, then black plaintiffs
would have settled for lower amounts, regardless of whether juries
had been in fact evenhanded. In other words, the perception that ju
ries valued blacks' claims less than whites' claims could have created a
self-fulfilling prophecy so that blacks' claims in fact were valued less in
the process of settlement. One can also infer that the devaluation pro
cess probably depressed the number of claims that injured black plain
tiffs brought, since their claims would have been less profitable and
thus less desirable for plaintiffs' lawyers to bring, than whites' claims
for similar injuries.
Taken together, this evidence indicates that claims by injured
black people were valued less, and settled for less , than claims by in
jured white people by at least some railroad companies. Informal, de
centralized practices by private actors seem to have resulted in
reduced compensation to black plaintiffs. In addition, railroads,
streetcar companies, and other actors that followed their lead then
had reduced incentives to prevent injuries to black people than to
whites, knowing that they could more cheaply compensate blacks for
their injuries.
PART II.

RACE AND WRONGFUL DEATH & SURVIVAL
CASES IN LOUISIANA, 1900-1949

A . Introduction
This section examines 152 Louisiana appellate wrongful death
and survival cases published between 1900 and 1949, comparing dam
age awards to black and white surviving family members of people
killed by torts. 46 In considering the broad topic E>f race and torts, fo
46. For the discussion in this section, all reported Louisiana wrongful death and survival
cases with Westlaw key numbers 117k95-99 from 1900-1949 were reviewed and included in a
database. The key numbers covered the following areas under the general heading of "death
actions:" measure and amount of damages awarded, in general (k95), statutory limits (k96), dis
cretion of jury (k97), inadequate damages (k98), and excessive damages (k99). Jennifer B. Wrig
gins, Database (August 24, 2005) [hereinafter Database) (on file with author). Computer
searches such as "Negro" and " tort," and "colored" and "tort," and similar searches were also
done in the Louisiana cases database and when a case revealed that a decedent was black, that
case was included in the database. /d. The analysis covered 152 cases. Twenty-six cases were
brought by black family members; the remainder, presumably, were brought by white family
members. /d. See infra note 48 for discussion of racial identity in these cases. Between 1900 and
1945, Louisiana had more reported wrongful death cases than many states, including Alabama,
Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, New York, Pennsylvania, Ten
nessee, and Virginia, and fewer than Texas and Missouri. Memorandum from David Goldman
(August 10, 2004) (on file with author).
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cusing on damages in cases involving fatalities makes sense. All
wrongful death and survival cases ultimately deal with the same in
jury, death, and so comparison of damage awards and cases facilitates
analysis of how race may have affected those damage awards. The
'same injury' point should not be overstated. Different deaths have
divergent effects on different families depending on factors such as
the financial support provided by the deceased to the family, and the
degree of emotional attachment between the deceased and the family.
Nonetheless, the injuries are similar enough that careful analysis,
which takes into account other factors besides race, is illuminating.47
In addition to the fact that appellate courts generally mentioned
the race of black tort plaintiffs,48 these cases are particularly fertile for
researching race and valuation because of two features specific to
Louisiana tort law. First, appellate review in Louisiana included re
view of the facts, so that appellate courts discussed the amount of
damages with more frequency and specificity than appellate courts in
47. In a broader sense, of course, quantifying a human life or the loss caused by the loss of a
family member is inherently problematic. The ongoing debates about the damage awards of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund reflect the difficulty. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra
note 13; Rabin, supra note 13. Yet part of the job of tort juries and judges is to quantify the
immeasurable, despite the problematic and contested nature of the entire enterprise.
48. Appellate cases in Louisiana, like cases in other states during this period, generally
identified the race of black plaintiffs. See generally, WELKE, supra note 7, at 379-389 (discussing
hundreds of reported civil decisions from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century which
identify the race of black plaintiffs).
For the purposes of this Article, the race of a decedent's family members is considered the
race of the decedent. Where no mention of, or details pertaining to, a party's race was made, it
is presumed the party was white. Inferences that a decedent was white sometimes are based on
historical context and details in the decision, such as that the "decedent was in the waiting room
for white passengers" when a flying timber struck and killed him. Taylor v. Vicksburg, Shreve
port.& Pac. R.R., 91 So. 732,732 (La. 1922); see also Hebert v. Baton ~ouge Electric Co., 91 So.
406 (La. 1925) (describing three year old child and "its negro girl nurse" asphyxiated by gas leak;
inference that child was white); Eichorn v. New Orleans & C.R. Light & Power Co. 38 So. 526,
529 (La. 1905) (describing children as attending "German pay school;" inference that decedent
was white); Donaldson v. Riddling's Succession, 145 So. 804, 804, 805 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir.
1933) (discussing "negro chauffer" of decedent and "negro boys" who reached the accident
scene first; inference that decedent was white). For some cases, the inference that a decedent
was white is based on the decedent's high-status occupation, see, e.g. , Gray v. Found. Co., 91 So.
527 (La. 1922) (describing decedent as land engineer, salesman and lubrication expert; inference
that decedent was white); Moore v. Jefferson Distilling and Denaturing Co., 123 So. 384 (La. Ct.
App. 1929) (describing decedent vice president of Lucas E. Moore Stave Co.; inference that
decedent was white). In WJ.lliams v. Brown, 181 So. 679 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1937), the dece
dent's race was not listed but it seems probable, from the circumstances including the racial caste
system separating white women from black men, DoLLARD, supra note 22, that she probably was
black. The twenty year old decedent, a farmhand and housekeeper, was killed when traveling
home from her mother's funeral, and she was a passenger in a truck with a "cargo of negroes
(eight or nine in all)," id. at 682, 683. These are not cases where litigants challenge the racial
identification made by the courts. See supra note 6.
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many other states. 49 Second, under Louisiana tort law, survivors of
family members tortiously killed could seek damages for their own
grief and emotional losses - an unusual feature in wrongful death stat
utes.50 The ways appellate decisions measured and discussed damages
for emotional loss and other types of harm provide insight into how
race related to valuing injury in torts.
Questions may be raised about whether Louisiana courts' treat
ment of blacks' death claims was representative of other states' treat
ment. Louisiana was typical in that it excluded black people from
participating in the legal system and voting, its black population was
poor on average, it passed segregation laws, and it experienced a cli
mate of anti-black violence during the early twentieth century and the
Jim Crow era.51 It was unusual in various ways, however, because it
had an unusually large black population, it included the survivor's
emotional losses in wrongful death damages, and its legal system
stemmed in part from French civillaw. 52 However, none of the ways
49. See William E. Crawford, Life on a Federal/stand in a Civilian Sea, 15 M1ss. C. L. Rev.
1, 2 (1994) (explaining that Louisiana appellate courts have the authority to: reverse jury find
ings on the facts and render a contrary judgment; find a defendant negligent when a jury had
exonerated her; and make its own finding of damages as long as there is record evidence to
support it, because there is no constitutional right to a civil jury trial in Louisiana).
50. DoBBS, supra note 4, at 807 (traditional wrongful death statutes allow recovery only for
"pecuniary loss" of survivors). See generally, WJTT, AccJDE"-'TAL REPUBLIC, supra note 19;
FRANK L. MARAJST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LouiSIANA ToRT LAw 423, § 18-5 (1996)
(explaining that each wrongful death beneficiary under Louisiana law is entitled to a damage
award that includes loss of love, affection, services, support, society, and grief).
51. See Henry C. Dethloff & Robert R. Jones, Race Relations in Louisiana, 1877-98, in XI
THE AFRJCAN-AMERJCAN EXPERIENCE IN LOUISIANA, PART B: FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO JIM
CRow 501, 501 -17 (The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, Charles
Vincent ed., The Center for Louisiana Studies 2000) (1968) [hereinafter Dethloff & Jones, ExPE
RIENCE] (recounting rise of segregation laws, exclusions of blacks from voting and jury service,
and increased lynching and other violence in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century in Louisiana). By 1900, for example, "(t)he vast majority
black voters was stricken
from the rolls." Mark T. Carleton, "Judicious" State Administration, 1901- 1920 119, in XI THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN ExPERIENCE JN LouiSIANA, PART C: FROM JrM CRow TO CiviL RIGHTS
119 (The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, Charles Vincent ed., The
Center for Louisiana Studies 2002) (1971). Stevenson's early twentieth century survey to court
clerks of counties with blacks being more than half the population showed that few black jurors
served in Louisiana. Supra note 22. One Louisiana respondent made the comment that "the
very best of our Negroes [serve on juries] .... very good service, rather prone to convict in
serious personal injury cases." /d. at 889.
52. Louisiana was one of the states with the highest proportion of black residents during
this period; in 1900 the state was 47.1% black; in 1950 it was 32% black. Campbell Gibson &
Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By His
panic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States, Working Paper
Series, No. 56, 2002, available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/
twps0056.html. Louisiana is a civil code state, its law having derived initially from French Jaw
rather than the common law. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 19, at 171-173; see also MARAJST
& GALLIGAN, supra note 50.
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in which it was unusual suggest that its treatment of tort claims by
black people was radically different from other states' treatment of
blacks' tort claims.53
B.

Wrongful Death Actions and Survival Actions under Louisiana
Law

Louisiana's wrongful death and survival provisions frame our dis
cussion. 54 Wrongful death actions and survival actions are concep
tually and legally distinct. Wrongful death actions are traditionally
based on a model of lost financial support and are aimed at compen
sating family members only for the financial loss caused by a loved
one's death .55 As noted above, Louisiana's wrongful death law also
53. Additional questions involve whether courts applied different standards of liability
based on race and whether families of black decedents lost more frequently than families of
white decedents in similar cases. The answer to whether more stringent standards of liability or
specific doctrinal rules were applied to black plaintiffs seems to be no, although further analysis
and study might show otherwise. One context that merits further analysis is the acceptance of
self-defense in some circumstances. In two cases, the results of which seem debatable, the fami
lies of black male decedents killed by white men were unable to recover because the killers
established that they had used reasonable force. Wade v. Gennaro, 8 So. 2d 561, 561 {1943)
(holding a proprietor of "negro barroom" [sic] was not liable for killing of drunken black man
who threw bricks at him); Williams v. Shreveport Cab, 183 So. 120 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1938)
(overturning trial court's decision and holding that a white cab driver who fatally shot "drunken
negro man" who threatened him was not liable to his widow and child). Courts did not always
accept the self-defense claims of white men who shot allegedly drunk or obnoxious black men,
however, so it is difficult to draw clear conclusions. See Randall v. Ridgley, 185 So. 632 (La. Ct.
App. 1939) {holding proprietor of barroom patronized by blacks liable for wounding obstreper
ous black man with gun because proprietor's use of gun was unreasonable and increasing dam
age award from $750 to $2,000); Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1939)
(rejecting self-defense claim of night watchman who fatally shot drunken black man in the back
and holding employer liable for the death).
54. LA. Crv. CoDE ANN. art. 2315 (2005). See also MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50,
at 415-26, §§ 18-1 to 18-9; Helmuth Carlyle Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death
at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TuL. L. REv. 201,223 (1931-1932). In 1931,
Voss wrote about the language of the LA. Crv. CoDE ANN art. 2315 ("Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.") that "[t]his
wide-sweeping article is the fundamental basis of tort law in Louisiana, and the breadth of its
language has rendered it a persuasive invitation to everyone to come into the courts and make
claims for which no other law of the state provides." Voss, supra, at 201 n.l. It was interpreted by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in the mid-nineteenth century to not allow wrongful death or
survival actions, making it necessary to amend it for those actions to be asserted. Hubgh v. New
Orleans & Carollton R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851). Voss noted that the article was amended in
1855 to provide that the tort claims of a person who died could still be asserted after the death of
the claimant, and this 1855 provision was a survival provision, not a wrongful death provision.
Voss, supra, at 221. But see, Witt, Origins ofModern Tort, supra note 19, at 755 n.S5 (listing 1855
amendment as a wrongful death Jaw). Voss explains that the 1884 amendments allowed the
survivors of a dead family member to file claims for losses connected to the death of a loved one.
Voss, supra, at 222. This amendment was a wrongful death provision. MARAIST & GALLIGAN,
supra, note 50.
55. DOBBS, SUPRA note 4, at 807.
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allowed compensation to family members for their emotionallosses.56
By contrast to a wrongful death action, a 'survival' action is the con
tinuation of a tort claim after death that the decedent would have had
if he had lived, "with damages that he could have recovered had he
been able to sue at the moment of death. " 57 Survival actions typically
include the decedent's pain and suffering and lost wages. 58 For exam
ple, if a person died instantly from another's tort, his family would not
be able to bring a survival action because he did not experience pain
or suffering or lose wages before dying.
If a person suffered before dying from a defendant's tort, rela
tives could claim damages in three categories: loss of financial sup
port; emotional loss; and losses the decedent could have claimed if he
had not died, such as pain and suffering. 59 The first two of these ele
ments would be compensable through a wrongful death claim, while
the third would be part of a survival claim. Both would be included in
the same lawsuit. Although these three categories are theoretically
distinct, appellate decisions rarely divided damage awards into the dif
ferent categories. Accordingly, it is often impossible to determine
how much of a particular award was aimed to compensate for losses in
a particular category. The facts discussed in the cases, however, often
are helpful in such a determination.
Wrongful death damage awards had the potential simply to re
flect preexisting financial disparities between blacks and whites,60 be
cause traditionally they were based on a model that evaluated
financial support lost by the family as a result of the loved one's death,
and blacks in Louisiana were poorer overall than whites. 61 In other
words, the death of a family member who earned low wages would
cause a relatively small financial loss to the family , so that one would
expect the wrongful death award for a low wage earner to be low.
However, wrongful death and survival awards in Louisiana had the
potential to go beyond reproducing existing economic disparities for
56. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50, at 423, § 18-5.
57. Donas, supra note 4, at 805. Both wrongful death and survival actions now exist only
when authorized by statute. /d. at 803. Survival statutes also provide that if a plaintiff has al
ready instituted an action, the action continues after her death. /d. at 805.
58. /d. at 805-806.
59. MA RAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50, at 422, § 18-4.
60. See generally, Chamallas, supra note 23.
61. See Dethloff & Jones, EXPERIENCE, supra note 51, at 503 (noting economically de
pressed situation of blacks in late nineteenth century Louisiana). See generally, ARNOLD RosE,
THE NEoRo IN AMERICA 68-70, 124-133 (1964) (summarizing information on widespread pov
erty and low wages among blacks).
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two main reasons. First, even if the financial support amounts lost by
black family members were less than amounts lost by whites, the total
awards should not necessarily have been less, because family members
also could seek damages for emotional losses. These emotional losses
would include loss of companionship and affection.62 Such emotional
losses are not linked to financial loss or to race. Second, survival cases
called for an exploration of how much the decedent suffered. Since
pain and suffering are not correlated with earning power in any obvi
ous way, and on some level, pain and suffering are universal despite
linkages to gender and racial tropes,63 survival awards had the poten
tial to go beyond existing financial disparities between blacks and
whites. Thus, by allowing emotional loss damages to survivors and by
allowing survivors to claim pain and suffering damages suffered by
decedents, Louisiana law provided a framework for analyzing loss that
went far beyond merely determining the financial loss caused by the
loss of a loved one.
C.

Race, Gender, and Family Structure

The wrongfuJ death and survival code provisions favored a cer
tain family structure, that of a husband supporting his wife and legiti
mate children, by recognizing harm to those family members when a
husband was killed. To the extent that black families had different
family structures, the law disadvantaged and, in many instances, ex
cluded them from recovery. These statutory exclusions fom1 an im
portant backdrop to the comparison of actual decisions in the next
section.
One way that wrongful death and survival law structured the rec
ognition of harm was through strictures based on marriage and legiti
.· macy. Louisiana did not recognize common law marriage,64 and
62. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50, at 423, § 18-5.
63. For example, in the nineteenth century, the widespread assumption in medical circles
and elsewhere was that black women, because of their race, were immune from the "extreme
sensitivity" that characterized white women. MARTIN S. PcRNICK, A CALCULUs oF SuFFERING:
PAIN, PROFESSIONALISM, AND ANESTHESIA IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 156 (1985).
Black women were thought to experience little suffering even during childbirth and major sur
gery. /d. It was similarly thought that black men were virtuaJJy immune from pain. /d. at 155
56; see also Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment?: Single-Sex Education and the Con·
struction of Race and Gender, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 15, 46-47 (2004) (describing history and racial
and gender stereotypes); see also WELKE, supra note 7, at 131, 177-78; Martha Chamallas &
Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright, 88 MICH. L. REv. 814 (1990) (describing
the association of white women with mental distress damages).
64. Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, To
gether with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 45, 78 (1981).
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"illegitimate" children, those born before or in the absence of a mar
riage between their parents, could not recover for the death of their
father or mother.65 Similarly, parents of "illegitimate" children could
not recover for the loss of their children in tort.66 The code provi
sion's exclusion of illegitimate children may have shaped the configu
rations of claims brought by blacks. This is because a greater
proportion of black children than white children were born out-of
wedlock during the relevant period nationally, and in Louisiana.67
Thus, the code provision probably made tort recovery impossible for a
larger proportion of black children whose fathers or mothers were tor
tiously killed than the proportion of white children that was barred
from recovery. 68 These same "illegitimacy" exclusions also precluded
tort recovery for a larger proportion of black parents whose children
were killed by torts than the proportion of white parents whose chil
dren were killed by torts.
The provisions also reflected gender asymmetry during much of
the period discussed here, by not allowing widowers to bring actions
for the loss of wives until amendments were passed allowing such re
65. Youchican v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 86 So. 551 (La. 1920) (holding that a child of a Tunica
Indian tribal member had no cause of action for his mother's death because parents had only
been married according to customs of Tunica tribe and had never been formally legitimated);
Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 16 So.2d 594 (La. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that minor
children of black decedent who lived with and were supported by him throughout their lives, and
who were recognized by the community as his children, could not recover for his death under
torts or workers compensation since parents were only married by "common law," and decedent
never acknowledged children as his in writing as required by statute). The interpretation of LA.
Crv. Com~ ANN. art 2315 to disallow claims brought by children outside marriage was struck
down in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). The plaintiffs in Levy were the five children born
out-of-wedlock to a black woman who may have died as a result of medical malpractice. See
John C. Gra y, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisi
ana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance, 118 U . PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1969).
·
66. Lynch v. Knoop, 43 So. 252 (La. 1907) (holding burden· of proof is on mother of de
ceased child to prove she was legally married; if she failed to so prove she could not recover for
loss of her child); Brown v. T.J. Moss Tie Co., 32 So. 2d 848 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1947) (holding
that a mother of deceased black illegitimate son could not recover damages related to his death
in tort or workers compensation).
67. See Robert D . Plotnick, Seven Decades of Nonmaritaf Childbearing in the United States,
(Working Paper, Feb. 2005). Data from 1935 to 1950 shows that a greater proportion of non
white childre n than white children was born out of wedlock in Louisiana. Zachary Brandmeier
(July 13, 2005) (unpublished memorandum on file with The Howard Law Journal). This data is
organized as white versus non-white, and does not appear to be available for 1900-1935. /d.
According to this data, 87.2% of the out-of-wedlock births in Louisiana in 1935 were to non
whites, while 12.7% of the out-of-wedlock births in Louisiana in 1935 were to whites. ld.
68. One factor that supports this inference is that where suits were brought for the deaths of
adults, 43% of the cases for deaths of black adults were brought by their parents while only 16%
of the cases for deaths of white adults were brought by their parents. Database, supra note 46.
These adult decedents may have bad children who could not sue because they were born out-of
wedlock.
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covery in 1918.69 By their structure, the laws recognized harm and
loss caused to a husband's family by his death, but completely denied
that harm and loss were caused to a wife's family by her death. These
gendered provisions, both passed in the nineteenth century, were part
of a broad cultural move to define the paradigmatic family as one
where a male breadwinner supported a stay-at-home wife.70 Given
black women's historical roles in slavery and afterwards as working
outside the family's home and providing financial support to the fam
ily, this enduring paradigm was in many ways a "white" family
model. 71
Wrongful death and survival laws, then, effectively created a par
adigm decedent and paradigm dependents - a husband who provided
for his wife and legitimate children. His death would create a finan
cial and emotional loss for the wife and children that the law would
recognize, if it was caused by a tort.72 To the extent that black families
did not fit the paradigms, because wives were not financially depen
dent on husbands, or because children were born outside of marriage,
these provisions reduced or excluded recoveries. 73
1. Averages, Medians, and Outliers: The Power of the Paradigm
Comparing average and median damage awards to surviving fam
ily members by race in Louisiana, black family members received
much lower awards than white family members. The average award
69. According to Voss, supra note 54, at 221, when Louisiana law was amended to allow for
a survival action in 1855, only the children, widow, or parents could assert the continuation of a
decedent's tort claim. Louisiana's wrongful death law, passed in 1884, continued the tradition of
limiting recovery to widows while entirely excluding widowers. /d. at 222. In 1918, the legisla
ture added language which seems to have been intended to allow husbands to file survival ac
tions, but the drafting was not entirely clear. /d. at 240. The Louisiana Supreme Court
interpreted the provision as continuing to allow widows but not widowers to bring both wrongful
death and survival actions. Elias v. City of New Iberia, 69 So. 141 (La. 1915); Flash v. La. W.
Ry., 68 So. 636 (La. 1915).
70. Wrrr, AcciDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 717. As Witt notes, the initial wrongful
death statutes passed in England allowed widowers to sue for the loss of a spouse, but U.S.
versions of these statutes intentionally departed from the gender-neutral English model. /d. at
720-721, 737-743, 736 n.54, 746-749.
71. Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82
GEo. L. J. 2481, 2488 (1994) (describing how the notion of a protected, domestic sphere for
women financially dependent on husbands has never applied to black women); Wuliams, supra
note 63, at 45-47, 54-56 (describing black women's work during slavery and afterwards).
72. This is not to suggest that the compensation generally provided was generous-it was not.
Witt, supra note 19.
73. For discussion of the racial and gender effects of the law of legitimacy in the inheritance
context, see Mary Louise Fellows, The Law ofLegitimacy: An Instrument ofProcreative Power, 3
CowM. J. GENDER & L. 495 (1993).
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to black family members, $3,559, was less than half the amount of the
average award to white family members, $8,245, during this period.74
The same was true for median awards. 75 Comparing the outliers-the
highest and lowest award amounts - to surviving family members by
race, black family members also were more poorly compensated. The
two highest awards to black family members were all lower than the
two highest awards to white family members.76 Similarly, the two low
est awards to black family members were all less than the two lowest
. awards to white family members.77 These are blatant disparities in
damage awards by race. However, further exploration is necessary,
because damage awards may have been affected by factual differences
between cases, such as differing amounts of pain and suffering exper
ienced by decedents, the relationship between the decedent and the
survivors, or other factors.
Widows and minor children of both races were the recipients of
the two largest awards in each racial category.78 As such, courts ap
plied the wrongful death and survival laws in a way that recognized
and rewarded the favored family structure of paradigm decedents and
paradigm dependents. In the highest award case with a black dece
dent, Johnson v. Hibernia Bank, the appellate court awarded $9,000
for the death of a fifty-five year old soap and perfume salesman, who
74. In the cases reviewed, the average recovery for white family members was $8,245 , while
the average recovery for black family members was $3,559 from 1900-1949. Database, supra
note 46.
75. Database, supra note 46. The median recovery for white family members was $7,021 ,
while the median recovery for black family members was $3,200 during the same period for the
cases reviewed. /d.
76. The two highest awards to surviving black family members were in Johnson v. Hibernia
Bank & Trust, 1927 WL 3381 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1927) (awarding $9,000); and Foy v. Little,
197 So. 313 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (awarding $8,294). The two highest awards to surviving white
family members were in Albright v. Tatum, 37 So. 2d 888 (La. Ct. App. 1948) (awarding
$29,000); and Alford v. La. & Ark. Ry., 38 So. 2d 258 (La. Ct. App. 1949) (reducing the award of
$25,000 by $650 for workers compensation expenses previously paid).
77. The two lowest awards to surviving black family members were given in Russell v. Tagli·
alavore, 153 So. 44, 48 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (awarding $500); and Poindexter v. Serv. Cab Co., 161
So. 40 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (awarding $839). The two lowest awards to surviving white family
members were in Marshall v. La. State Rice Milling Co., 81 So. 331 (La. 1919) (awarding $2,000);
and Constabel v. Miller, 131 So. 699 (La. Ct. App. 1933) (awarding $2,500}, and Hebert v. City of
New Orleans, 163 So. 425 (1941) (awarding $2,500).
78. See Johnson , 1927 WL 3381 (awarding $9,000 to a black decedent); Foy, 197 So. 313
(awarding $8,294 to the widow and children of a black decedent). The two highest awards to
surviving white family members were in Albright, 37 So. 2d 888 (awarding $29,000 to the widow
and minor children of a white decedent), and Alford, 38 So. 2d 258 (awarding $25,000 to the
widow and minor children of a white decedent, reduced by $650 workers compensation expenses
previously paid).
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was also "a negro preacher," to his widow and two children.79 The
appellate court articulated, in familiar terms, the tension between in
dividual adjudication and treating like cases alike. It noted that "each
case is considered independently on the merits and on the state of the
facts peculiar to it, a due regard, however, being always had to the
proper observance of a reasonable conformity of jurisprudence on
general lines." 80 In other words, courts should be reasonably consis
tent in order to assure fairness, but each case is unique so that rigor
ous consistency is unnecessary. The second highest award for
survivors of black decedents was for $8,294 for the loss of a thirty-two
year old married truck driver who was a father of three minor
children.81
The two highest awards to family members of white decedents
also involved paradigmatic decedents and paradigmatic dependents.
The highest awards were for $29,00082 and $25,000 both to widows
and minor children.83 Though widows and children recovered the
largest awards generally, the damages awarded to black widows and
children were significantly lower than those awarded to their white
counterparts.
The fa vored family model also seems to have played a role in the
lowest awards for both races. In all of the low award cases, in each
79. 1927 WL 3381, at *1, *2. The children were aged eighteen and seventeen. /d. at *1. He

was killed by a collapsing wall, lived for thirty minutes with no evidence of pain and suffering,
earned $130 a month and had a life expectancy of seventeen years. /d.
80. /d. at *3. It awarded the widow $5,000 for loss of support, $500 for mental pain, $500
for funeral expenses and $1500 for each of two children, which totaled $9,000. /d. The judgment
at trial had been $7,500 for her loss of support and was otherwise the same. The appellate court
found that that amount was excessive and reduced it to $5,000. /d. at •2.
81. Foy , 197 So. 313.
82. Albright, 37 So. 2d 888 (La. Ct. App. 1948). No details of decedent's age, occupation or
earnings, but an award of $14,000 for widow was affirmed "but an award of $8,000 for each of
three minor children was reduced to $5,000 per child. ld.
83. Decedent railway engineer who apparently died instantly from collision with another
company's train was forty-eight years old, had twenty-two year life expectancy, and earned $215
$225 per month. The court affirmed the trial court's award of $10,000 for widow which also
accounted for "loss of support, companionship, love, care and protection,'' and $5,000 for each
minor child, in addition to allowing workers compensation lien of $1,900 to be paid from the
judgment. /d. In addition, there were several white decedent cases that resulted in $15,000
damage awards. See, e.g., Gray v. Found. Co., 91 So. 527 (La. 1922) (awarding $15,000 for death
of husband and father to his widow and four minor children for engineer who died instantly from
boat falling on him); Feely v. National Packing Co., 75 So. 837 (La. 1917) (awarding fifty-four
year old widow and thirteen year old son of a fifty-four year old "good husband and father" who
earned $150 a month a total of $10,000 and $5,000 respectively after decedent experienced pain
ful death following explosion. However, there was no specificity as to what part of award is for
his pain and suffering); Leitz v. Rosenthal, 166 So. 651 (La. Ct. App. Orleans 1936) (awarding
$15,000 to widow and two minor children for death of husband in car accident). These were well
above the highest awards to survivors of deceased black family members.
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racial category, the decedent either was not a husband/father or the
survivors were not widows/minor legitimate children (or both). For
example, the two lowest awards to family members of black decedents
were $500 awards to widowers for the deaths of their wives.84 In each
case, the spouses were estranged and not living together and the
courts discussed this in their opinions. 85
Following this pattern, the lowest awards to white family mem
bers also were in families that did not fit the paradigms. The lowest
award, $2,000, was made on behalf of an emancipated minor child for
the death of his mother.86 The second lowest white award, $2,500,
came in the death of a seventy year old mother in a suit brought by
her adult, unmarried daugbter.87 In this context of awards to families
that did not fit the paradigmatic structure, awards to white survivors
far exceeded those to black survivors.
2.

Case Comparisons

Another way to approach race and valuation is by comparing
similar cases. Comparing contemporaneous cases that involve dece
dents of different races indicates that race played a role in devaluing
the claims brought by black family members relative to white family
members' claims.
84. Russell v. Taglialavore, 153 So. 44 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (awarding $500); Poindexter v.
Serv. Cab Co., 161 So. 40 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (awarding $500 plus $339 to decedent's father for
medical and funeral expenses).
85. Russell, 153 So. at 48-49; Poindexter, 161 So. at 41-42.
86. Marshall v. La. State Rice Milling Co., 81 So. 331 (La. 1919). The lower court award of
$3,000 to the minor child had included $1,000 for the mother's pain and suffering, but, on appeal,
this was set aside because she died instantly. ld. at 333. The siblings were barred from recovery
because they were adults and adult children can only sue under the code provision if there are no
minor children. /d. The decision Jacks details about the mother's age, support or relationship to
the child. Even though the decision refers to the child as emancipated, this does not seem to
have been considered a bar to the assertion of the claims. See generally, Andrew Gates, et. al.,
Symposium: ContractUill Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 47 TuL. L. Rev. 1085, 1093,
1098 (1973). There were three ways to become an emancipated minor during the relevant time
period. One way was by notary signed by the father, or mother if the father was dead or not
available, the second was by a judicial order of emancipation if the parents had treated the child
cruelly, and the last was by getting married. /d.
87. Constabel v. Miller, 131 So. 699, 700 (La. Ct. App. 1933). The mother died less than a
month after a car accident. /d. Presumably, the mother did not support the daughter financially,
because the decision does not specify. Of the $2,500 award, $644 consisted of funeral expenses,
nursing expenses, and the daughter's loss of salary, which leaves $1,856 for the mother's pain and
suffering, and the daughter's grief. /d. The appellate court noted how modest the award was
and that the plaintiff did not appeal the award, id., perhaps hinting that they might have in
creased it had they been asked. An additional $2,500 award was in a case involving a sixty-three
year old sister killed in an accident who suffered twenty days before dying. Hebert v. City of
New Orleans, 163 So. 425 (La. 1941).
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One pair of cases involving black and white decedents, Hebert v.
Baton Rouge Electric Co. and Kent v. Baton Rouge Electric Co., arose
out of the same incident; comparison of these cases leads to a conclu
sion that devaluing black parental grief or the support provided by the
black decedent influenced the evaluation of the two deaths. 88 A gas
outlet was left open in an apartment, and a three year old white child
"and its negro girl nurse," a seventeen year old girl, died as a result.89
No pain and suffering apparently were involved for either decedent,
so the cases were "pure" wrongful death cases. The families of each
decedent successfully sued Baton Rouge Electric Company. In each
case, the same judge presided at trial, the lawyers for the plaintiffs and
defendants were the same, and the defendants appealed to the Louisi
ana Supreme Court. In the case involving the three year old white
child, which was decided first, the court noted that large awards are
generally not allowed for deaths of young children, citing a long string
of precedents involving compensation for the deaths of young chil
dren, and awarded $2,500 to each parent, a total of $5,000. 90 In the
later case involving the asphyxiated black nurse brought by the
nurse's mother, the defendants tried to argue that the mother should
only get $2,500, just like each of the parents of the three year old
white child. 91 But the court stated:
[W]e do not regard the ruling on the amount of damages in that
case as a precedent for this case. In the case [for the white three
year old's death], there was no financial loss.... The daughter of
the plaintiff in this case ... was 17 and a half years old, and the
evidence is that she was already of some financial aid to her mother.
She attended night school and was comparatively well advanced.
Be that as it may, we cannot estimate grief and suffering in dollars
and cents.92
The mother of the black teenager was·awarded $5,000 while each
parent of the white child was awarded $2,500 (a total of $5,000), so the
88. Hebert v. Baton Rouge Elec. Co,. 91 So. 406 (La. 1922); Kent v. Baton Rouge Elec. Co.,
97 So. 433 (La. 1923).
89. Hebert, 91 So. at 406. The child's gender was not specified.
90. /d. The precedents included a case where the parents of a deceased black child killed by
a neighbor's child playing with a gun were awarded $2,500 each, a totaJ of $5,000. Sutton v.
Champagne, 75 So. 209 (1917) (awarding $5,000 to parents for death of nine year old black male
child who was killed by neighbor's child playing with gun). For discussion of changes in valua·
tion of children, see VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING So
CIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 140·165 (1985).
91. Ken t, 97 So. at 346. The suit was brought by the mother and there was no indication of
tbe father's locatjon.
92. Jd.
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black teenager's life did not in an obvious way count for less than the
white child's life.93
However, further reflection, particularly on the age of the dece
dents, suggests a different conclusion. If it is assumed that a parent's
grief can not be quantified, the threshold for a damage award might
be a uniform amount for grief at the loss of a child. The next step
would be to apply the model of lost financial support (which would
not allow deaths of young children to result in large awards) and add
an estimate of the financial support lost by the mother of the black
teenager as a result of her child's death. Given that model, the award
for the loss of the teenager, who was in school, working as a nurse,
and providing some support for her mother, clearly should have been
much higher than that for the loss of the three year old who was not
providing any monetary support to its parents.
In several other pairs of cases, such as the roughly contemporane
ous Louisiana Supreme Court decisions in Pierre v. Powell Box Co. 94
and Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 95 the devalua
tion of black decedents' and survivors' claims is striking. In Pierre,
where a black sixteen year old suffered a painful workplace injury that
resulted in the amputation of his arm and his death eighteen months
later, his parents were awarded $7,500 on appeal. 96 The award was
both for the decedent's suffering for the period between the accident
and his death, and for the parents' loss of the "prospective support,
companionship, and filial affection" provided by the decedent. 97 Vin
cent awarded $10,000 to the parents of a white sixteen year old who
was fatally shot by a night watchman as he threw rocks at a train.98
Although the ages of the decedents were the same, the facts concern
ing pain and suffering were extremely different. The black decedent,
93. We do not know if, for example, the child's father had also sued, whether the award to
both parents would have been $10,000.
94. 77 So. 943 (La. 1918).
95. 74 So. 541 (La. 1917).
96. Pierre, 77 So. at 947. A $2,500 verdict was deemed insufficient. /d. Louisiana passed a
workers compensation statute in 1915. Jill Williford, Comment· Reformers' Regress: The 1991
Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 22 ST. MARY's L.J. 1111, 1145 n.38 (1991). The Pierre deci
sion does not specify when the injury was sustained but given the long period of suffering be
tween the injury and the time when the decedent passed away, it seems plausible that the injury
took place before the law went into effect.
97. Pie rre, 77 So. at 947.
98. 74 So. at 549. In several other cases where one parent had sued for the Joss of a child,
the court awarded $5,000. Johnson v. Indus. Lumber Co., 60 So. 608 (La. 1912) (increasing
award of $2,326.50 to $5,000 for mother of deceased minor son); Parker v. Crowell & Spencer
Lumber Co., 39 So. 445 (La. 1905) (awarding $5,000 to father for loss of minor son).
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Lucien Pierre, suffered for eighteen months before dying, 99 while the
white decedent did not suffer at all. 100 Moreover, the degree of sup
port provided to the family seems to have been different. The black
decedent was working and apparently providing some support to his
family, 101 while the white decedent had never provided any support to
his family .102 Comparing the pain and suffering of the decedents and
the financial support they provided to their parents, Lucien Pierre 's
parents should have received a much larger award than the parents in
Vincent. Instead, they received an award that was significantly
smaller. Lucien Pierre's suffering, the support he provided, and the
grief of his parents seemingly counted for less. 103
Another vivid contrast is provided by two cases decided by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana in 1939, Young v. Brous
sard, 104 and Thibodaux v. Culatta. 105 In Young, a twenty-nine year
old unmarried black man, Pentard Young, was fatally shot by a night
watchman at his former place of employment, suffering two days
before his death. 106 Thibodaux involved an adult, unmarried white
male, Alcide Thibodaux Jr., who was killed instantly in a car acci
dent.107 In Young, the parents were awarded $3,500; in Thidodaux the
parents were awarded $5,040. Reviewing the decedents' suffering
alone, one would expect a larger award for the parents of the black
Pentard Young, who suffered two days, while Alcide Thibodaux Jr.
died instantly. 108 Yet, the award to Pentard Young's parents was a
significantly lower amount. Differences in the amount of financial
support provided by the decedents do not explain the differing dam
age awards, because the amount that each decedent contributed to his
99. Pierre, 77 So. at 945.
100. Vincent, 14 So. at 544
101. Pierre , 77 So. at 947. It appears he was providing support to his family based on the
damages claimed by his parents. /d.
102. Vin cent, 74 So. at 545.
103. A later case that was factually similar to Vincent in that it also arose from a railroad
employee fatally shooting someone provides an instructive comparison. Rousseau v . Tex. &
Pac., 1926 WL 3375 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 2 , 1926). It was decided nine years after Vincent and
Pierre; the decedent was a twenty-nine year old black man who provided support to his parents
and suffered for several hours before dying as a result of a railroad detective's gunshot. The
court awarded his parents only $6,000. Not only was he not engaging in illegal behavior at the
time of the death, but he suffered before death and supported his parents, factors which should
have made it a case for a significantly larger award than the $10,000 award for the rock-throwing
sixteen year old who died instantly from a railroad employee's gunshot in Vincent.
104. 189 So. 477 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
105. 192 So. 712 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
106. You ng, 189 So. at 478.
107. Thibodaux , 192 So. at 712.
108. You ng, 189 So. at 479.
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parents' was almost identical, and in fact the contributions of the de
cedent in Young were expected to continue while the contributions of
the decedent in Thibodaux were about to cease. 109 The suffering of
the black decedent, his financial contributions, and his parents' grief
and loss may have been what was in actuality devalued by the court. 110
These comparisons show that while, in theory, the Louisiana
courts applied "a reasonable conformity of jurisprudence upon gen
eral lines, "111 sometimes they departed from that rough consistency in
ways that seem unmistakable from today's vantage point. In some
instances , the suffering of black decedents, the economic support they
provided to their families, and the grief of surviving family members
seem to have counted for less than those of whites.
D. Use of Segregated Precedents
Appellate courts in cases involving black decedents sometimes
determined the appropriate damage award based on the awards given
in earlier cases involving black decedents.l1 2 These cases did not
merely reference the race of the decedent, but actually used "black
only" or racially segregated precedents to determine benchmarks for
damage amounts. In other words, to these courts, the principle of
treating like cases alike meant comparing deaths of black people only
with the deaths of other black people. Deaths of white people, be
109. In Young, 189 So. at 481, the black -decedent contributed three to four dollars a week to
his parents' support and this was expected to continue. In Thibodaux, the white decedent con
tributed fifteen dollars a month to his parents' support but this was expected to stop after his
marriage which was supposed to take place a week after the accident that ended his life. 192 So.
at 714. The First Circuit Louisiana Court of Appeals decided Thibodaux six months after Young
but did not cite Young as precedent for the damage award.
110. If we take into account activities that the decedent was engaging in at the time of his
injury, we may have a partial explanation. We consider that the white decedent in Thibodaux
was killed in a car accident while the decedent in Young was killed while drunkenly trespassing
on his former employer's property. In Young, the night watchman who killed the decedent con
vinced the lower court that he had acted in self-defense in shooting the decedent. Young, 89 So.
at 480. This was rejected on appeal as implausible, but perhaps the decedent's more blamewor
thy behavior may have been factored into the damage amount. However, returning to the
$10,000 award for the rock-throwing white sixteen year old decedent in Vincent, his blameworthy
behavior was not taken into account in reducing the award to his parents. Vincent, 14 So. at 549.
Moreover, as discussed in the next section, the court in Young actually used racially segregated
"black only" precedents to determine the low damage award. See infra Part II.D.
111. Johnson, 1927 WL 3381, at •3.
112. See, e.g. , Young, 189 So. at 481. But see Rousseau v. Tex. & Pac., 1926 WL 3375 •12-•13
(La. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1926) (citing cases of wrongful death awards to families of both black and
white decedents in determination of amount of wrongful death award to parents of black man
killed by defendant). This use of segregated precedents seems to have taken place almost only
during the 1930s, and specifically in the Louisiana Fust Circuit Court of Appeals, for reasons
that remain unclear.
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cause they were excluded from the analysis, seem to have been con
sidered another kind of harm.
The most glaring example of this is Young v. Broussard, discussed
above, where Pentard Young was killed by a night watchman.U3 The
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's
judgment for the defendant, and awarded Mr. Young's parents $3,500.
In fixing this amount, the court cited three precedents involving dam
age awards for a black decedent, first listing a $3,000 damage award
for a black decedent 114 and then going on to state:
[I]n the [ ] case of Shamburg v. Thompson, Trustee, we affirmed an
award of $3200 to the mother of a twenty two year old colored boy
who was injured by the train at nine o'clock in the morning and died
in the afternoon of the same day. The parents of a twenty-nine year
old colored boy were allowed $6,000 for loss of love and affection,
support, etc., and for the pain and suffering of the deceased in the
case of Rousseau v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., et al. We have decided to
fix the award in this case at $3500, which amount we believe to be
proper under the facts and circumstances of this case.U 5

The court, referring to the adult decedents in some of the prece
dential cases as " boy" even when the cases themselves did not, used as
its frame of reference only cases involving black decedents. Those
cases resulted in low awards, and although there were cases decided
by the same court involving white decedents whose families received
higher awards, the court did not cite them. 116 In fact , the court actu
ally skipped over a case that it had decided three years before involv
ing the death of a white man in his twenties,117 which resulted in a
higher award, and reached back thirteen years to a case involving the
death of a black man in his twenties decided by a different appellate

113. Edwards v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 185 So. 111 (Ct. App. La. 1st Cir. 1938). Edwards
involved the death of a twenty-nine year old man who "lived with his parents, colored tenants."
/d. at 113.
114. Young , 189 So. at 481.
115. The trial court had ruled in the favor of the employer, accepting the night watchman 's
argument that he had ftred in self-defense. The decedent had been laid off earlier that day and
had returned, drunk , to his former employer's property repeatedly in the middle of the night.
116. See, e.g. , Bodin v. Tex. Co. 186 So. 390 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (awarding $7,000 for the
death of white seven year old child, $1,000 of which was for pain and suffering); Boykin v.
Plauche, 168 So. 741 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (awarding $8,780, of which $780 was for funeral ex
penses, to mother of twenty-three year old white son who was educated but had never supported
her fmancially). The court states that losses of adult children are worth more fmancially than
losses of younger children. /d. at 746.
117. Boykin , 168 So. at 741.
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court, which resulted in a lower award. 118 The appellate court seems
to recognize the harm to the victim and his family as a different, and
necessarily, lesser harm than that which would befall a white family in
comparable circumstances.
Seve ral other decisions for the tortious deaths of black family
members also based their awards only on earlier cases involving black
decedents. 119 However, the use of precedent is complex and the use
of racially segregated precedents was not universal. For example, in
the 1927 case Johnson v. Hibernia Bank & Trust, 120 mentioned above,
an award to a widow and children of the decedent contained a lengthy
list of cit ations to damage awards in cases involving deaths of hus
bands and fathers, both white and black. 121 Johnson , in turn, was cited
by three later cases, one involving a black decedent, and two involving
white decedents. 122 In both cases involving white decedents, Johnson
was cited as useful authority, without mentioning the decedent's
race. 123
The use of segregated, "black only" precedents shows that race
mattered in creating frames of reference for damage determinations.
The judges who used these precedents did not treat like cases alike,
but actually treated harm to black people as different in kind from
harm to white people, as reflected in their usage of an entirely differ
ent frame of reference for damage determinations depending on the
race of the litigants. The outcome of using a "black" frame of refer
ence for damage determinations was lower damage awards for black
families. The use of racially segregated precedent not only reflected
the conceptualization of injury to blacks as different from and lesser
than injury to whites, but it also ensured that injury to blacks would
continue to be treated as less serious than injury to whites.

118. Rousseau v. Tex. & Pac., 1926 WL 3375 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1926), 1926 WL 3375
(awarding parents $6,000 for malicious killing of twenty-nine year old black decedent who sup
ported his pa rents and suffered before dying,).
119. See, e.g. , Coon v. Monroe Material Scrap Co., 191 So. 607 (La. Ct. App. 1939);
Poindexter, 161 So. 40; Powe v. Morgans La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 1927 WL 3992 (La. Ct.
App. June 7, 1927).
120. Johnson v. Hibernia Bank & Trust, 1927 WL 3381 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1927).
121. ld. at *3-*5.
122. Coon , 191 So. at 612 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (black decedent); Donaldson v. Riddling's
Succession, 145 So. 804, 808 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 1933) (white decedent) ; Kern v. Knight, 127
So. 133, 138 (La. Ct. App. 1930) (white decedent).
123. Donaldson, 145 So. at 808; Kern , 127 So. at 137.
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E.

Racial Generalizations and Differences in Tone

This section analyzes two aspects of cases that may not directly
affect the devaluation of injuries to black people, but may be impli
cated in it. The first is the use of racial generalizations; the second is
differences in judicial tone.
In several cases, judges articulated negative generalizations about
blacks and indicated that the decedent either departed from or acted
consistently with such generalizations to justify the amount of their
award. By contrast, in no case did judges articulate generalizations
about white people and indicate that the decedent either departed
from or acted consistently with such generalizations. Blackburn v.
Louisiana Railway & Navigation Co. 124 presents perhaps the most
vivid example of how racial generalizations about a black decedent
resulted in a low damage award to his family. In that case, Justice
Provosty of the Louisiana Supreme Court reduced a verdict for the
mother of a thirty-one year old brakeman from $6,250 to $1,985 with
the following words: "Considering the well-known improvidence of
the colored race, and the irregular life these colored brakemen lead,
we think t hat upon this evidence a regular allowance of $15 per month
would lean more to the side of liberality to the plaintiff than
otherwise." 125
In McNeil v. Boagni, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
described the black decedent, a laborer, in the following terms: "The
proof shows that all he earned went to his family to which he was
devotedly attached; that he had no vices, did not drink or gamble,
unusual qualities for a colored man. " 126 Noting that his remaining life
expectancy was over nine years and that although he was sixty-nine
years old he was "very vigorous, remarkably well preserved and effi
cient," the court increased the widow's award from $1,750 to $2,000. 127
In Powe et al. v. Morgan's La. & Tex. Ry Co., the defendant railway
company argued that the plaintiff widow had deserted her husband
and that since she had been unfaithful to him, she was not entitled to
recover damages. 128 The trial judge, in language that the appellate
court later approved, rejected this argument, saying: "It is true that
the plaintiff may have been guilty of indiscretions, but such indiscre
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

2005]

54 So. 865 (La. 1910).
/d. at 869.
153 So. 352, 356 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
/d.

Powe v. Morgans La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 1927 WL 3992 (La. Ct. App. June 7, 1927).
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tions can be considered as mostly characteristic of the colored race.
There is no positive testimony to convince me that she had abandoned
her husband and was living as the concubine of another. " 129 In
Shamburg v. Thompson, the court referred to the twenty-two year old
decedent as "boy." 130
In some cases courts seemed to use a particularly warm tone in
connection with the deaths of white men. For example, in Horrell v.
Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., the decedent suffered for about twenty
four hours, and the court wrote:
His clothing was literally burned from his body by the acid. It is
practically impossible to place a monetary value on human life, and
it is quite impossible to value in dollars and cents human suffering.
No one knows whether the young man, had he lived, would have
soon married. How long he would have continued to assist in the
maintenance of his parents we are unable to say. We have consid
ered many awards sanctioned by us and by the Supreme Court in
other cases. We find it unnecessary to discuss items making up the
respective claims of the two parents. Suffice it to say that, having
given due consideration to many former awards, and in view of the
exemplary habits of the young man and his most excruciating suffer
ing during the last hours of his life ....131
The court awarded $5,000 to each parent.132 In Blackburn, where
the damages to the brakeman's family were significantly reduced be
cause of the purported "irregular life" led by "colored brakemen," the
decedent's head had been crushed in a grisly manner, but the court
calculated a small amount for his pain and suffering because he died
so soon after. 133 Though the facts of these two cases were different,
the description of the decedent's death in Blackburn could have been
more vivid and sympathy-evoking t~an it was, and perhaps, the dam
age amount would correspondingly have been more substantial. 134
129. /d. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of $1,500 for the widow and
$3,000 for each child, noting also that the husband and wife had written letters to each other and
that it was common for husbands and wives not to keep letters they sent one another, so no
inference should be drawn from the fact that none of the letters were produced. /d.
130. 186 So. at 618-19; see also Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477, 481 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1939).
131. Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., 131 So. 709,716 (La. Ct. App. 1930) (emphasis
added). Another example is the tone employed by the court in Boykin, 168 So. at 746, stating
decedent was "splendidly equipped mentally and with every prospect of success").
132. Horrell, 131 So. at 716.
133. Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 54 So. 865, 869-70 (La. 1910}.
134. This is not to suggest that courts were always callous towards claims for black suffering;
for example in Pierre v. Powell Box Co., 77 So. 943, 946 (La. 1918), the Louisiana Supreme
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In Thibodaux v. Culotta, 13s mentioned above, where Alcide
Thibodaux Jr. was killed instantly in a car accident, the appellate court
used flowery language unmatched in cases involving black decedents:
"we realize that it is impossible to compensate the parents fully in
dollars and cents for the great mental suffering and heartbreak occa
sioned by the tragic death of their son." 136 In Kent v. Baton Rouge
Electric Co., involving the gas asphyxiation of the black teen-aged
nurse, the court simply said of the mother's grief, "we can not esti
mate grief and suffering in dollars and cents. " 137
The impact of the appellate courts' difference in tone towards
blacks and whites, and of derogatory generalizations about blacks, is
difficult to quantify, and it should not be considered in isolation from
what appellate courts actually did regarding blacks' and whites'
claims. The language the courts sometimes used suggests that racist
norms affected the decision-making process to the detriment of black
plaintiffs.
F.

Conclusion

The wrongful death and survival decisions discussed here present
a picture that, while more favorable to black plaintiffs than many
might expect, does not resemble equal treatment under the law. The
appellate courts in wrongful death and survival cases often ruled in
favor of black plaintiffs, but black plaintiffs' claims were often deval
ued relative to whites' claims. The average and median awards for
black families were less than half those for white families. Awards for
the death of a husband who supported his wife and legitimate minor
children-the favored family structure-were the highest in each ra
cial category. Yet, awards for deaths of black decedents were on aver
age much lower than awards for the deaths of whites, even in cases
brought by black widows for the death of a husband and father of the
couple's children. In addition, the favored family paradigm itself priv
ileged a family model that was more common for white families than
for black families, with a consequence that black family members who
lost a loved one from a tort would be less likely to be able to seek
recovery for the death than white families who lost a loved one.
Court found that the damage amount for the young man's eighteen months of suffering between
the injury and death was inadequate, using quite sympathetic language.
135. 192 So. 712, 712 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
136. /d. at 715.
137. 97 So. at 346.
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While the law itself provided ample opportunity for courts to evaluate
a loved one's loss in a way that went far beyond monetary contribu
tion provided by the decedent, the law as applied seems to have re
flected traditional assumptions that placed the highest value on
financial support provided by the husband to his widow and legitimate
children. Lower value seems to have been placed on emotional losses
suffered by survivors. Comparison of roughly contemporaneous cases
featuring decedents of different races shows that the financial contri
butions of black decedents, their pain and suffering, and the grief of
black survivors, at times, were weighed more lightly than similar
harms suffered by whites. Moreover, courts' use of "black only"
precedents to make damage decisions about the value of black dece
dents' claims, at the same time that they ignored precedents involving
white people's deaths, shows that racial categorization contributed to
blacks' claims being valued less than whites.' Finally, the courts' use
of racial generalizations about blacks and the differences in tone and
rhetoric further exemplify how race was implicated in the valuation of
tortious injury. The torts system, through the process of individual
ized adjudication, violated the principle that similar injuries should be
treated similarly.
PART III. RACE, STATUS AND HARM: "A COLORED MAN
... HAS NOT THE SAME AMOUNT OF INJURY
UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT A
WHITE MAN WOULD HAVE." 138
One of the most conspicuous departures from the principle of
treating like cases alike was a New York case, Griffin v. Brady, which
was notorious at the time, but has since receded into obscurity. 139 The
New York Times on May 22, 1909 carried the headline, 'Negro Not
Equal to White: Suffers Less Humiliation in False Arrest, Court
Holds.' 140 George Griffin, a black Pullman porter, had sued Daniel
Brady, President of Brady Brass Company, for false imprisonment
damages because, he claimed, Brady had "maliciously caused his ar
rest on the charge of having stolen a card case containing $20, several
138. Negro Not Equal to White: Suffers Less Humiliation in False Arrest, Court Holds, N.Y.
May 22, 1909, at 16 (hereinafter Negro Not Equal to White) .
139. Griffin v. Brady, 117 N.Y.S. 1136 (App. Div. 1909) (mem.), affd per curiam, 118 N.Y.S.
240 (App. Div. 1909) (denying motion for reargument and stating that its affirmance "is not to
be taken as an approval in any degree of the expression by the trial court of its views in colloquy
with counsel."), affd, 126 N.Y.S. 1130 (App. Div. 1910) (mem.).
140. Negro Not Equal to White , supra note 138, at 16.
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railroad passes, and valuable papers, but the next day, when the case
was investigated by a Magistrate, he was discharged." 141 The events
took place in MontreaJ.l 42 A jury in New York found Brady liable
and awarded Griffin $2,500. 143 After the verdict, the trial judge, for
mer Congressman Philip Dugro, told Griffin's lawyers "that he would
set the verdict aside unless their client would consent to a reduction of
the amount of damages to $300. " 144 When they refused, the judge
carried out his threat, and this decision was affirmed in three separate
appellate orders, none of which discussed its substance. 145 Griffin
then apparently accepted the reduction of damages to $300.
Justice Dugro's courtroom comments, with a reporter present, at
tracted attention. Referring to Griffin, Justice Dugro reportedly said:
He was a porter, and while he is just as good as the President of the
United States, and if he is imprisoned wrongfully he should be paid
for it, it would be a bad argument to say that he is just as good in
many senses. He would not be hurt just as much if put in prison as
every other man would be. That depends on a man's standing, what
his circumstances are, and, if he is a colored man, the fact that he is
a colored man is to be considered ... [I]n one sense, a colored man
is just as good as a white man, for the law says he is, but he has not
the same amount of injury under all circumstances that a white man
141. /d. Daniel Brady himself went on to become a charter member of the New Jersey
Chamber of Commerce. N.J. Chamber of Commerce, Who are we? NJ Chamber of Commerce
Charter Members: 1911-1913, http://www.njchamber.com/Membership/chartermernbers .htm (last
visited April 22, 2004). Daniel Brady's brother, the New York Times reports, was "'Diamond
Jim' Brady, one of the best known financiers of the 'gilded age."' Negro Not Equal to White,
supra note 138, at 16.
142. Negro Not Equal to White, supra note 138, at 16. Presumably Griffm sued in New York
because Brady and he were New York residents. There is no way of knowing, of course, whether
Griffin would have been so promptly cleared of misconduct had the events of the case not taken
place in Montreal but had taken place in the United States.
143. /d. ~
144. /d.; see also Infoplease, Dugro, Phillip Henry, (1855-1920), at http://www.infoplease.
comlbiography/us/congress/dugro-philip-henry.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005}.
145. Griffin , 117 N.Y.S. at 1136; 118 N.Y.S. at 240; 126 N.Y.S. at 1130. Griffin probably could
have appealed to the New York Court of Appeals but may have felt that it would be unavailing.
The appellate division denied Griffin 's motion for reargument, stating that "the affirmance by
this court without an opinion of an order of the trial court, made in the exercise of its discretion,
setting aside the verdict of a jury, is not to be taken as an approval in any degree of the expres
sion by the trial court of its views in colloquy with counsel." Griffin, 118 N.Y.S. at 240. The
order also stated, "All that is determined is that this court has declined to reverse an order made
in the discretion of the Trial term, directing a new trial, upon which new trial all the issues are to
be presented de novo to another jury." /d. This order is not a model of clarity. Paraphrasing,
the trial court had the discretion to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial, and the appel
late division affirmed that exercise of discretion. However, still paraphrasing, the appellate divi
sion was not intending to endorse the trial court's expression of his views, in his discussion with
Griffin's lawyer. It is not entirely clear exactly what the appellate division is not endorsing.
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would have. Maybe in a colored community down South, where the
white man was held in great disfavor, he might be more injured, but
after all that is not this sort of a community. In this sort of a com
munity I dare say the amount of evil that would flow to the colored
man from a charge like this would not be as great as it probably
would be to a white man.146

The New York Times published a critical editorial on the case,
which stated that the judge's decision to reduce Griffin 's verdict
"made talk all over the country. Nobody could deny that there was a
sort of truth in it, and yet almost everybody had an instinctive realiza
tion that somehow the thing was, or ought to be, wrong. It was, in
short, the indictment and condemnation of a race, without regard to
its better part or its exceptional members, and that is repugnant to the
modern sense of equity."147 The editorial also chided the appellate
court for the ambiguity of its comments about Justice Dugro's collo
quy with counsel, since the comments could be read either as indirect
criticism of Justice Dugro's views or the fact that he expressed those
views. 148 The Times criticism seemed to echo W.E.B. Dubois' notion
of a "talented tenth" of black Americans whose qualities and achieve
ments deserved the respect of white Americans. 149
More incisive criticism came from an article in the Virginia Law
Register, later reprinted in the Central Law Journal, entitled A New
York Court Draws The Color Line. 15° Calling the decision "remarka
ble," the article sarcastically noted:
We are exceedingly glad that this decision came from a court of
justice north of the Potomac. Had it occurred in a southern state we
can imagine the agony of mind that it would have cost the New
York Evening Post and a few other journals of that character. We
146. /d. A Boston newspaper quoted Justtce Dugro somewhat differently, including "I think
if you were to take the Mayor of the city and arrest him he would feel very much more humili
ated than this porter, from the fact that he was the Mayor and not a colored man, for if he were a
colored man he might not feel quite as much humiliation and shame." Negroes' Feelings
Cheaper- Judge Says White Man Is Entitled to More Damages, BoSTON PoST, May 22, 1909.
Much of the Boston paper's quote is identical to the NEw YoRK TIMES quote; it is not clear
whether the New York Times omitted the Justice's quote about the Mayor or if there is a conflict
in the two accounts.
.
147. Editorial: No Light on the Main Point, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1909, at 6.
148. /d. The case was also mentioned critically by Stevenson, supra note 22, at 905, in a way
that suggests the author expected more public criticism of it would ensue.
149. W.E.B. Du BOis, THE TALENTED T eNTH , IN THE NEGRO PROBLEM 33 (Humanity
Books 2003) (1903).
150. A New York Court Draws The Color Line, 69 CENT. L.J. 118 (1909) [hereinafter Color
Line). The Central Law Journal was a weekly journal for practicing lawyers, published in St.
Louis, Missouri starting 1874, which mainly contained information about cases in the Mississippi
Valley. 1 CENT. L J. l (1874).
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do no t believe that in our Court of Appeals the court would have
listened for one moment to an argument based upon the color of
the suitor before it.151

The article ridiculed the decision, stating that the court would have
had to go back to the fourteenth century to find support for it, and
that color should have been irrelevailt. 152 It said that if punitive dam
ages were at stake as in this case, a plaintiff's "station" should not be
relevant to damage determinations. 153
It is impressive that in 1909, a jury awarded $2,500 to Mr.Griffin
against the President of Brady Brass Company for what were essen
tially mental distress and dignitary damages. 154 Yet, it is equally note
worthy that the reduction in damages, based solely on the plaintiffs
race , was upheld by the New York appellate courts.
The trial judge's justification, and the controversy it created, illu
minate enduring tensions linked with torts and race. The trial judge
attempted to avoid the basic principle of formal equality that similar
injuries should be treated similarly, by categorizing the injury to a
black person caused by false imprisonment as different in kind from
an injury to a white person caused by the same tort. He justified the
damage reduction by imagining a comparison between the actual situ
ation and a hypothetical one. The actual situation (black plaintiff
falsely imprisoned) and the hypothetical one (white plaintiff falsely
imprisoned) were not the same, in his analysis. Although the defen
dant's actions were tortious in both situations, a different injury oc
curred and therefore a difference in treatment was called for because
151. Color Line, supra note 150, at 119.
152. /d. The article cited Bodrengam v. Arcedekne, "which was reported in Year Book 30
and 31, Edw. I, page 106, decided in the year 1302 ... !' /d. Justice Brumpton apparently stated
in that case, " that a buffet given to a knight or·noble was as bad as a wound given to one of the
rabble." /d. A "buffet" in this context is " a blow or cuff with or as if with the hand." THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DicriONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). The article
noted that "we imagined the world had advanced a little since that time and that the Jaw knew
no man 's color when he was impleaded in the courts." Color Line, supra note 150, at 119. The
article went on to say that that " we are inclined to think that the majority of the court was right
and that in fixing damages the station of a man in life should be the guide in the ascertainment.
but we do not think that the Jaw books have always sustained this in questions where exemplary
damages are allowed." ld. The article noted that Griffin was purely about exemplary damages,
and under Virginia law, once some damage was established (as was clearly the case here) it was
up to the jury to determine them and the amount could not be reviewed unless they were "influ
enced by improper motives." Jd.
153. /d.
154. See supra note 22, regarding racial composition of juries. Pullman porters were not paid
much, so it is likely that the litigation was fmanced by contingency fee agreement. LARRY TYE,
RISING FROM THE RAILS: PULLMAN PORTERS AND THE MAKING OF THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS
88 (2004). See also WELKE, supra note 7.
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of the different race of the victim in each situation. His statements
about different damage amounts based on race, then, supposedly did
not violate the general principle that similar injuries should be treated
similarly, because the injuries were not similar.
Moreover, the judge's decision, by tying damage amounts to
group-based concepts of race and status, ignored the tort principle
that injuries should be evaluated individually. 155 Part of the purpose
of the false imprisonment tort is to compensate individual victims for
personal humiliation and insult. 156 Thus, the judge's decision that this
victim did not suffer as much as the jury thought he did, runs directly
contrary both to the purpose of this tort and to the principle that the
damages for this tort are necessarily subjective.
The reasoning that justified the result was circular, rather like the
use of segregated precedents to determine damages. The generalized
inferior caste status of blacks was the reason for them to receive less
compensation than whites when injured by the same torts. 157 Mr.
Griffin was inferior in the first place, and so damages awarded to him
should be less than those of a white man who, by definition, had a
higher status than a black man, according to the judge. The fallacy of
this argument, pointed out by the Virginia Law Register article, is that
[t]he injury to a man for false imprisonment might be far greater in
the case of a humble man working for a daily wage than in the case
of a millionaire. The fact that the former had once been in prison,
although innocent, might cause him to have great trouble in secur
ing a position such as a porter upon a Pullman car .... The injury,
therefore for false imprisonment to a porter on a Pullman car, even
though he was colored, might be far greater than to a Vanderbilt or
a Rockefeller. 158

Moreover, the injury to Mr. Griffin's actual sense of dignity might
have been far greater than the injury Mr. Brady would have suffered;
but at any rate the jury had the task of making that determination.
One reason that the case received widespread attention is that it
clearly deviated from two familiar ideas which were central to torts
even in times of particularly virulent racism: These are the ideas that,
155. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
156. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 48 (W. Page
Keeton, 5th ed. 1984).
157. Race-specific economic earnings projections, which project that blacks will earn Jess,
because they have earned less, are sometimes used in tort litigation to this day. See, e.g.,
Chamallas, supra note 23.
158. ld.
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first, damages should be assessed with reference to the individual's
situation; and second, similar injuries should be treated similarly. In
stead of assessing the damages with reference to the individual's situa
tion, with only a sweeping glance at whether damages are consistent
to satisfy (or seem to satisfy) equal treatment principles, the judge
instead insisted that damages correspond to race and status. In the
scores of appellate decisions read for this Article involving tort claims
brought by African American victims in the twentieth century, explicit
justifications for compensating white plaintiffs more than African
American plaintiffs because of race are rare. 159 Trial judges, of course
may have made similar remarks that were not reported. Nonetheless,
racial inequality has appeared more commonly in subtler guises, such
as in individualized adjudication or settlement practices that collec
tively resulted in overall lower awards for blacks than for whites. 160
The tort principle that injuries should be evaluated individually, com
bined with the principle that similar injuries should be treated simi
larly, render unacceptable, or at least controversial, broad statements
that the race and status of an injured person should correlate with the
amount of damages.
PART IV. POST-1949 EVIDENCE
Tort decisions no longer reference the race of the parties, and
formal mechanisms of racial exclusion from the legal system are no
longer allowed. Debate persists about how much difference race and
racism continue to make in the U.S. legal system. Issues pertaining to
tort litigation in general, much less issues of race in tort litigation, are
extremely difficult to study because of challenging empirical issues.161
In depth consideration of contemp<;>rary issues pertaining to race and
159. One similar instance is in Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 54 So. 865, 869
(La. 1910) (reducing damage amount because of " the well-known improvidence of the colored
race , and the irregular life these colored brakeman lead . ...").
160. See supra Part. I; Part. II.B.l.
161. See Galanter, supra note 18; Saks, supra note 18; Schwartz, supra note 18; see also Au
DREY CHIN & MARK A . PETERSON, DEEP PocKETS, EMPTY PocKETs: WHo WINS IN CooK
CoUNTY J u RY TRIALS vili (1985) (analyzing effect of race on civil justice system and verdicts);
MARK A . PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CJVIL JURY: TRENDS tN TRIALS AND VERDICTS,
CooK CouNTY, lLLJNOJS, 1960-1979 1, 1 (1982) (noting that most information about civil jury
trials is based on anecdotal evidence). In a 1990 Washington State report, average settlements
for minorities with asbestos claims were lower than for non-minorities, but the report itself ac
knowledges that more information is needed to understand the significance of that outcome.
JusTICE CHARLES Z. SMrTH, WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY & JusTICE TASK FoRCE FINAL
REPORT 11 (1990); cf Chamallas, supra note 8, at 463 (noting that "[g]ender and race have
disappeared from the face of tort law" but arguing that they remain significant).
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torts is beyond the scope of this Article, but some general observa
tions will be made. 162
The most systematic published study of civil trials and race ana
lyzed 9,000 civil jury trials in Cook County, Illinois, from 1959-1979.163
It found that "race seemed to have a pervasive influence on the out
comes of civil jury trials. "164 When black plaintiffs won, they "re
ceived smaller awards, only 7 4 percent as much as white plaintiffs
received for the same injury." 165 The pattern of blacks' claims being
devalued, which we observed in the Louisiana cases, appears to have
continued. The Cook County study noted that "[t]he disadvantage for
black plaintiffs did not lessen in recent years." 166 However, the period
this study covered ended about twenty five years ago. The report also
noted that blacks were underrepresented in proportion to their popu
lation in Cook County as both plaintiffs and defendants, suggesting
that perhaps "[b]lacks might have been more reluctant to file lawsuits
and lawyers might have been less willing to take their cases-if they
foresaw a lesser chance of winning or a small award if they won. " 167
The Cook County study demonstrates how race had a significant im
pact in torts in the latter half of the twentieth century. Inequality and
bias may still persist in the tort system in submerged forms today, for
example in devaluing harm to blacks relative to whites or in informal
barriers to participation in the torts system.168

162. For more contemporary consideration, see McClellan, supra note 23, and Chamallas,
supra note 23.
163. CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 161.

164. /d.
165. /d. The study notes that "[b]lack plaintiffs won somewhat less often than white: 40% as
opposed to 46%, for example, in automobile accident trials." ld.
166. /d. at ix. Regarding black defendants, the study notes that they "also lost somewhat
more often than whites, with the difference again similar to that for plaintiffs. Liability decisions
were about the same, then, when both parties were of the same race, but lawsuits between par
ties of different races produced substantial differences: White plaintiffs, for example won 62% of
slip and fall trials against black defendants, but black plaintiffs won only 50% of such suits
against white defendants." ld. at viii. The report goes on to note that awards against black
defendants were 10 percent less than awards against black defendants in similar trials. /d. at ix.
Thus, jury decisions did not always work to the disadvantage of blacks, however, the report
speculates that juries may have perceived that black defendants had fewer resources and so
made lower verdicts, id. But "the lower awards against black defendants further reduced awards
to black plaintiffs," since most suits against blacks were brought by other blacks. /d. at ix.
167. /d. at ix.
168. See supra note 23.
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CONCLUSION
Part of the story of "the color line" 169 in twentieth century law is
the role that race and racism played in valuing injuries caused by torts
in the United States. African Americans were systematically excluded
from authoritative roles in the legal system, but participated as tort
plaintiffs with considerable success in the first half of the century. In
stitutional characteristics of the torts system, such as the use of contin
gent fee agreements that broadened access to the tort system, and the
practice of individualized adjudication, all contributed to this success.
However, the principle that like cases should be treated alike was
clearly violated in many instances, with claims brought by black plain
tiffs devalued in the settlement and adjudication of torts cases during
the first half of the twentieth century. The process of racial categori
zation was a significant mechanism in devaluing blacks' claims. Pow
erful actors in the torts system, ranging from railway company claim
agents to trial and appellate judges, focused on the race of injured
black people in the course of measuring their injuries, finding that
their race necessarily made their injuries from torts worth less than
injuries to whites. From a claims manual that asserted "a negro brake
man is likely probably only a negro," to a trial judge who said that a
black man's injury was necessarily less substantial than a white man's
injury, to appellate judges who measured harm caused by the deaths
of black family members based only on earlier cases involving deaths
of blacks, these actors put harm to blacks in different categories than
harm to whites. This categorization process was one mechanism that
enabled decision-makers to ignore and evade the principle, important
even during this era, that like cases should be treated alike.
Moreover, the tradition in torts that every injury is individualized,
with no exacting requirement that resuits in cases be compared, gave
free reign to whites' bias and unfavorable treatment of blacks' claims,
and also made such bias and unfavorable treatment very difficult to
detect. Aggregate analysis of awards in dozens of fatality cases shows
that awards to black families for the loss of a loved one were less than
half of those to white families in similar situations. Losses suffered by
blacks were treated as less valuable than losses to whites in otherwise
comparable cases, and by the structure of wrongful death law. As
awards to blacks were lower than awards to whites, torts cases both
reflected and reinforced racial inequality. Such lower awards were
169. D u Bots, supra note 1.

2005]

137

Howard Law Journal

significant in themselves, but they also gave potential defendants
lower incentives to prevent harm to blacks than to whites. Torts cases
collectively gave a "public law" message that blacks were inferior to
whitesP 0 Despite the achievements of the Civil Rights Movement
against racial inequality, evidence suggests that devaluation of injury
to blacks persisted past the first half of the twentieth century. Going
forward , although race is no longer on the surface of tort law, we must
be alert to the ways that different aspects of the torts system may con
tribute to devaluing blacks' tort claims.

170. Green, supra note 2.
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